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⑨ Combat Operations After Action Report

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO SF 96347

12 27p.

AVBD-C

10 August 1966

SUBJECT: ~~Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BEAUREGARD~~
(EAGLE BAIT)Headquarters, 1st Brigade
101st Airborne Division 1-8THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO US Forces 96240TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO US Forces 96243

⑩ OACSFOR

⑪ OT FD-66X020

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1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation BEAUREGARD (EAGLE BAIT).
2. (U) Dates of Operation: 24 June through 15 July 1966.
3. (U) Location: KONTUM Province.
4. (U) Command Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Willard Pearson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
6. (U) Task Organization:

a. The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation BEAUREGARD (EAGLE BAIT) was as shown below. This organization remained relatively unchanged throughout the operation.

TF 1/327

1/327 Inf
A 2/320 Arty
12 Tm, A 326 Engr

TF 2/502

2/502 Inf
12 Tm, A 326 Engr

2/320 Arty

B 1/30 Arty (OPCON)

Spt Bn (-)Bde Troops

HHC (-)
A 2/17 Cav
A 326 Engr (-)
MP Plat (-)
1/101 Avn Sec
20 Chum Det
HE 142, 245 Psy Ops Co
181 AT Det
3 RRU
LRP

b. During the operation, three CIDG companies operated with the Brigade through mutual coordination with the Commanding General. Two CIDG companies (DAK TO) with USSF Tm A 244 worked with TF 1/327 and TF 2/502 respectively. Also, one CIDG company (LING BUK) with USSF Tm A 243 worked with the Brigade troops. These units and one Regional Forces company served as maneuver elements, protected radio relay sites, protected artillery batteries, protected Brigade base camp and screened flanks of attacking units. Also CIDG elements (DAK PEK) with USSF Tm A

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(EAGLE BAIT) (RCS: MACV J3-32)

242 screened the LAOTIAN/RVN border and DAK POKO River north of the Brigade area of operation. Long range reconnaissance Apache Patrols were also employed to obtain information of enemy locations.

c. TF 2/327 Inf remained detached from the 1st Brigade and was attached to the 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) in WY PCA on Operations KATHAN HALE and NEMER CLAY.

7. (C) Supporting Forces.

a. 2/320 Art: Employed in a direct support role.

b. B 1/30 Art (GFCV): Provided general support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

c. 10th Army Aviation Bn: Provided two light airmobile companies plus six UH-1D and four UH-1B aircraft in general support. In addition, two operational CH-47 aircraft were provided from the 1st Cav Div.

d. 129th and 182d Avn Co: Provided a total of four O-1 aircraft in direct support.

e. 245th Psy Op Co: Provided two loudspeaker and leaflet teams in general support.

f. 5th Air Transport Squadron: Provided airlift support for Psy War Ops.

g. 299th Engr Bn (Combat): Provided one company in general support.

h. 7th USAF: Flew ten Tactical Air missions totalling twenty-five sorties. Of these missions, nine were preplanned and one was immediate. The immediate strike was requested through the Air Force Direct Air Request Net and the response time from the initiation of the request until time-over-target was twenty minutes. The results of these missions included 5 VC KBA(BC), 21 V: KBA (E3T), 3 structures destroyed and 19 structures damaged.

i. 498th Med Det (Airmobile): Provided continuous medical evacuation for the Brigade throughout the operation.

j. MACV and USSF Adv Teams, 24th Special Tactical Zone (ARVN) provided liaison and coordination with ARVN, RF, PF and CIDG forces in the area of operation.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 2, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam directed the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct surveillance of the LAOTIAN/CHAMODIAN/RVN borders; block and ambush VC/NVA infiltration routes; and fix and destroy enemy in zone.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: Initially, the concept of the operation was to screen the area east of the DAK POKO River and to employ deception measures to bait the enemy from suspected hiding places into terrain favorable to friendly forces. Following the first seven days of the operation, the concept was to move west and conduct surveillance, blocking and ambush operations between the DAK POKO River and the LAOTIAN Border. Later in the operation, the Brigade conducted search and destroy operations to exploit intelligence indications and contacts made with the enemy by reconnaissance forces.

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[REDACTED] Report, Operation BEMURREG-3D
(EAGLE B.I.T) (RCS: MACV J3-32)

11. (C) Execution: On 24 June, Operation BEMURREG-3D (EAGLE B.I.T) began with the infiltration of reconnaissance elements and attached CIDG forces to the east of the D.K. POKO River. (See Inclosure 3A, Operation Schematic, Period 24-30 June). These forces screened all known and suspected enemy infiltration routes. In addition, one rifle company was moved into each of the battalion areas of operation as an immediate action force capable of exploiting any major enemy contact. All possible measures were taken to deceive the enemy as to the presence of friendly forces and to entice him to disclose his presence. Aerial reconnaissance and resupply to the forward elements were severely restricted. Because of little contact, reconnaissance elements and battalion reaction forces moved west of the D.K. POKO River on 1 July. (See Inclosure 3B, Operation Schematic, Period 1-7 July). The 1/327 Inf (-) moved by helicopter to conduct surveillance, blocking and ambush operations in the north, while elements of the 2/502 Inf infiltrated on foot to screen infiltration routes in the south. On 5 July, when reliable intelligence sources indicated that two VC companies were moving toward the LAOTIAN Border, the Brigade immediately reacted by placing two rifle companies of the 1/327 Inf, one platoon of A 2/17 Cav and a battery of 2/320 Arty into blocking positions along the D.K. ROLONG and D.K. BLOC Valleys. On 7 July, the 2/502 Inf (-) made an airmobile assault on Objective JEN to conduct search and destroy operations in exploitation of a contact made by the Brigade reconnaissance elements with the enemy. (See Inclosure 3C, Operation Schematic, Period 7-11 July). The 2/502 Inf suffered four killed and six wounded from mines located in the vicinity of one of the landing zones near D.K. SUT. Engineer mine clearing teams were rapidly lifted into the area and worked diligently in marking the mine field and destroying a portion of the mines. Having received only one minor enemy contact in the D.K. ROLONG and D.K. BLOC Valleys, the 1/327 Inf (-) conducted an airmobile assault to Objective PETE, east of the 2/502 Inf (-). Both battalions converged on the suspected enemy from opposite directions. Following the link-up between the two battalions on 11 July, the 1/327 Inf (-) continued its search and destroy operations to the south. The 2/502 Inf (-) conducted an airmobile assault to the east on Objective PRINCE and swept south to Objective LOU. (See Inclosure 3D, Operation Schematic, Period 11-15 July). When intelligence reports indicated an enemy build-up along the CAMBODIAN Border, elements of the 1/327 Inf rapidly executed an airmobile assault to Objective KNIGHT and established a blocking position there. Having made no significant enemy contact, all units returned to D.K. TO II Airfield on 14 July and 15 July in preparation for deployment to TUY HOA.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission of conducting surveillance of the LAOTIAN, CAMBODIAN and RVN borders; blocking and ambushing VC/NVA infiltration routes; and fixing and destroying the enemy in the zone.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the operations: 18 VC KIA (3C), 5 VC KDA (BC), 21 VC KDA (EST), 17 VCS and 6 ralliers. In addition, nine individual and crew served weapons were captured and large quantities of rice and barley were destroyed.

c. Friendly losses during the operation were as follows: 6 KIA, 39 WIA.

13. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel and Administration: See Inclosure 1, Personnel and Administration.

b. Logistics: See Inclosure 4, Logistics.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BEMUREG-3D
(EAGLE BAIT) (RCS: MACV 23-32)

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. Reception Techniques: Had additional helicopters been available to the Brigade, reception missions would have been flown to areas in which operations were not being conducted. Such techniques might have been effective in deceiving the enemy.

b. CH-47 "Piggy-back" Loads: The technique of sling loading ammunition under the howitzers in an Artillery displacement saves time and minimizes the time a helicopter requires on the ground. A minimum of four CH-47 helicopters must be provided for displacement of the Artillery to insure responsiveness where it appears that major enemy forces will be encountered.

c. Psychological Warfare: The complete saturation of a target is not the answer to a successful psychological warfare campaign. To be most effective, the leaflet program must be introduced into an area where strong tactical pressure has been applied. A four to six week psychological warfare campaign is considered to be the time frame required to produce lucrative results.

15. (C) Commander's Analysis:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) The importance of having interpreters available who are familiar with the local dialect was reaffirmed. CIDG personnel familiar with the local language were effective in obtaining valuable intelligence information from the natives. This information could not be obtained by the intelligence personnel without the interpreters' assistance. The need for qualified interpreters will continue to be an important requirement.

(2) The effects of the then approaching monsoon season were felt during the operation. At times aircraft and helicopter support was inoperative due to inclement weather. However, there were no periods in excess of five hours which precluded the use of helicopters.

(3) The individual soldier must be impressed with the fact that although there are cases of isolated mines, the detonation of a single mine may well indicate a mine field.

(4) In dense jungle terrain, where few natural helicopter landing zones exist, small Engineer clearing teams must habitually be provided to each battalion. These teams can build or improve landing zones for use by helicopters conducting medical evacuation, resupply and troop lifts.

(5) The use of allied and indigenous forces are a valuable asset which will conserve or augment the forces available to a US unit commander. In this operation, Apache reconnaissance forces were invaluable as an extension of our resources.

b. Highlights of Operation:

(1) Throughout the period, CIDG units worked in mutual cooperation with the Brigade. The CIDG personnel enjoyed working with US troops and performed in an enthusiastic manner. The troops of the Brigade gained additional confidence in the local CIDG units. The cooperation and performance of duty of the CIDG and their USST advisors in KONT M Province was the best and most professional that this Brigade has experienced in the past six months.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MAURETTE
(EAGLE BAIT) (JCS: MASH-11-32)

(2) Twice during the operation, mine fields were located by our forces. Upon locating a mine field the tactical forces stayed clear of the area, and mine sweeping elements from the Engineers were immediately deployed with a small security force. The mine fields were marked and/or destroyed depending upon the extensiveness of the mine field network.

(3) Although no significant contact was made during the operation, it is believed that the techniques of deception and employment utilized would have been extremely successful if there had been greater numbers of enemy forces in the area.

16. (C) Recommendations:

a. That a minimum of four CH-47 helicopters be provided to the Brigade when supporting Artillery must be moved by an air LCC.

b. That the use of Artillery Mobile Training Teams be considered by other US tactical units as a means to improve Artillery techniques of Vietnamese units and to foster a better understanding and relationship between US and Vietnamese forces.

c. That steps be taken by higher headquarters to rigidly enforce the proper reporting and recording of mine fields as prescribed in current doctrine.

d. That organic and supporting logistical agencies continue to collocate in future operations.

e. That provisions be made for medevac helicopters with a more effective hoist capability to support the Brigade during future operations.

Willard Pearson
WILLARD PEARSON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

Inclosures

- 1 - Personnel and Administration
- 2 - Intelligence
- 3 - Operations Schematics
- 4 - Logistics
- 5 - Communications
- 6 - Civil Affairs
- 7 - Pay War
- 8 - Artillery

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Enclosure 1 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BEAUREGARD

1. (C) UNIT STRENGTHS:

a. Beginning of Operation BEAUREGARD.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of operation BEAUREGARD were as follows:

Authorized	4490
Assigned	5677
Joined not Assigned	93
Present for Duty	4500
Not Present for Duty	1177
Air Head Strength	2321
Base Camp	1597
Tuy Hoa	579

(2) The assigned strength was 126% of authorized strength, the present for duty strength was 100% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 421 were hospitalized personnel.

b. Conclusion of Operation BEAUREGARD.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation BEAUREGARD were as follows:

Authorized	4490
Assigned	5558
Joined not Assigned	186
Present for Duty	4269
Not Present for Duty	1289
Air Head Strength	2475
Base Camp	1300
Tuy Hoa	574

(2) The assigned strength was 121% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 95% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 341 were hospitalized personnel.

2. (C) Casualties:

a. Casualties for Operation BEAUREGARD were as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>
1/327		21
2/502	4	13
2/320	1	1
HHC-LRRP		2
17 Cav	1	2
TOTAL	6	39

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Inclosure 1 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BEAUREGARD (EAST BATT)

b. Total Casualties to date are as follows:

KIA	236
WIA	1245
MIA	2

3. (c) Personnel Services:

a. Utilization of in-country rest and recuperation facilities on a 24-hour basis. During this operation, 7 personnel a day were given the opportunity to utilize the facilities of the MCV compound in Pleiku. In addition, 25 men a day were flown to Kontum for an 8 hour visit.

b. JG, Finance, SJM, and American Red Cross Representatives visited the forward area and provided assistance.

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1. Terrain:

a. Terrain was mountainous, covered with dense foliage. The ridges were high with the ravine sides steep. Bamboo and broad leaf tropical plants dominated the lower regions with evergreens showing at higher elevations.

b. Observation and fields of fire were limited by dense undergrowth and the rugged terrain; however, cover and concealment were enhanced by the same factors. Highway 14 is the principal north south route of approach, while the bridge (ZB 015213) and by pass site (YB 9484C2) between Dak To and Dak Sut are keys to the logistics to the area.

c. Vehicular movement was restricted to the main avenue and a few smaller roads. Generally vehicular overland movement is impossible due to the terrain. Foot movement is slow and difficult.

2. Weather:

a. The weather was dominated by the southwest monsoon with the cloud conditions and rain being as expected. Visibility was sharply reduced during the early morning, late afternoon and evening hours due to low ceilings and ground fog conditions. Visual air reconnaissance was impossible at times because of obscuring of the ground by fog. Scattered thundershowers were frequent, causing hazardous flying conditions over some areas. These thundershowers generally shifted within an hour or two, increasing visibility and bettering conditions. A particularly violent thundershower would cause small streams to rise sharply for two to three hours within a small area. Best times for visibility were generally between 1000 hours and 1530 hours.

b. Winds were generally west to east and of negligible to moderate intensity. Heavy winds were not experienced.

c. The temperature was cool with variations from 73° F - 75° F at night to 83° F - 85° F during the day. Humidity was generally high.

3. At the beginning of Operation BEAUREGARD the following information was available concerning enemy activity.

a. Trails used for infiltration from Cambodia and Laos crossed the operational area.

b. Total strength in Kontum was believed to include 3800 NVA personnel, eight to ten local guerrilla companies with a strength of 560 personnel and 2100 militia.

c. The 630th NVA Division was believed to have been located in the Chu Prong Base Area (SW Pleiku) and could have been deployed to the Kontum area as a reinforcement. The 403rd, 407th and 409th Main Force battalions were also available for reinforcement from Binh Dinh province.

d. Indications show that the 12.7mm AA MG was being employed in the area.

e. Extensive fortifications in the area indicated a war zone type complex that took a great deal of time to prepare (est more than 6 months).

f. The 4th Bn, 24th NVA Regt was believed to be withdrawing to a rest area in the vicinity of Dak Sut (YB 9352), along Highway #14. The 5th Battalion was withdrawing to an unknown rest area.

g. Interrogation reports indicate a mission of the 4th Battalion, 24th NVA Regiment was to attack Dak To and then Tan Canh during monsoon season.

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a. Interrogation reports place the last resupply to the 4th Battalion at 1 June for ammunition and 31 May for food.

4. (C) During the operation, the intelligence situation was developed through:

a. Information obtained from VCS produced only data such as the status of Hamlet or Village populace. Names of VC sympathizers were recorded. VCS did not have knowledge of NVA units or any other Order of Battle information.

b. Visual Reconnaissance: VR was flown an average of 9.5 observer hours per day for the past operation and revealed fortifications, heavy trail activity and several radio antennas. VR confirmed several SPARs and checked Red Haze activity within the Bde TAOR. A total of 6 photo missions and 2 Red Haze missions were requested and flown in support of the operation. VR A/C found many LA weapons, and A/C received 2 .50 caliber hits on one occasion.

<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>RESULTS/ACTION</u>
XB 992195	Circular clearings in bamboo thickets near Bde Base area.	SPAR rptd VC unit in area. Further ground check revealed diggings in clearing were friendly.
XB 778420	Mast-like object in field, poss radio antenna.	Fired Ol-D rockets, results unknown.
XB 901451 & XB 895450	A/C found .50 cal AA MG, and drew fire w/tracers. Weapon fired at many A/C in area.	Arty fired, wpn moved to new location, fired arty again, results unknown.
XB 917540	Poss rice storage area, U/G entrance w/boards supporting entrance.	Rpt to S-2.
XB 9625 to XB 796258	Well used trail running into jungle, showing signs of recent heavy use.	Red Haze revealed heavy use of trail at night.
XB 902537	20 foxholes w/overhead cover.	Rpt to S-2.
ZB 135564 to ZB 143558	60-70 anti-helicopter stakes in rice paddies	Rpt to S-2.
ZB 016552	VC trenches and foxholes on ridge line.	Arty adjusted and 75% of fortifications destroyed.
ZB 040513	75 new foxholes in defensive perimeter.	Rpt to S-2.
ZB 073475	15 new foxholes, camouflaged, with fields of fire cleared in undergrowth.	Rpt to S-2.
AS 820400	Area shows signs of heavy activity, many huts, cultivations and well used trails.	Rpt to S-2
XB 868943	Large number of elephants, appear wild, but may be pack elephants.	Rpt to S-2.

Note: VR listed above does not include all missions, but is merely a listing of more significant sightings.

c. The Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon was utilized extensively for the detection of enemy locations, movements, and/or supporting activities.

(1) 1 July - The LRRP reported mortar fire via ZB 083444 and noted heavy recent trail activity moving to the north out of general area ZB 0940.

(2) 3 July - The LRRP discovered a wallet (ZB 065396) lost by a member of the 2/502. The wallet had been lost during a battle with the 4th Bn, 24th NVA Regt at a point farther east. Conclusion: The 4th Bn, 24th NVA Regt withdrew through ZB 065396 and subsequently north.

(3) 6 July - The LRRP received small arms and automatic weapons fire from YB 983562, YB 983569, YB 993573, YB 996563 and YB 987560.

(4) 7 July - The LRRP contacted a small VC element at YB 957517.

(5) 10 July - The LRRP sighted 17 VC moving SE at YB 764269.

(6) 11 July - The LRRP contacted an estimated VC platoon at YB 762270.

d. Through coordination with Special Forces, Apache teams were made available as an additional reconnaissance means.

e. Liaison with the 42nd ARVN Regt, CIDG companies in our AO, and 24th STZ Headquarters were complementary intelligence sources.

f. The location of large quantities of rice and barley were utilized as indications of VC activity in the area:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>QUANTITY AND TYPE (TONS)</u>
YB 920430	2 1/2 (rice)
YB 923404	1 "
YB 912445	1/2 "
YB 957435	1/2 "
YB 951318	3 (barley)
YB 920411	1 (rice)
YB 950560	1/2 "
YB 918424	12 "
YB 960567	3 1/4 "
YB 955564	10 1/2 "

5. Results:

a. Initial Order of Battle:

(1) Prior; the following is a listing of known units in this area of operations:

200th Arty Bn
407th MF Bn
13th AA Bn
24th NVA Regt

(2) PWs, ralliers and suspects: no worthwhile information has been obtained during this period from the interrogation reports.

(3) Total Strength: 4,360 to include VC and NVA personnel.

(4) Initial Enemy Disposition:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
200th Arty Bn	YB 9363	200	19 Jun	Confirmed
407th MF Bn	BR 1685	200	"	"
13th AA Bn	Unknown	Unk	"	None
24th NVA Regt	Dak To - Tau Morong	1000	"	Approximate

b. Order of Battle Summary: During recent operation no new or additional information has been compiled, constituting no change to the present Order of Battle.

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6. (C) Intelligence Analysis, Lessons Learned:

a. Analysis:

(1) Because of the losses suffered during Operation HAWTHORNE, the elements of the 24th NVA Regt appeared to be avoiding further contact with US forces.

(2) Local enemy forces continue to operate as a deterring force in those areas where food supplies exist. Although incapable of sustained defensive operations, their presence is sufficient to make CIDG and ARVN surveillance difficult if not unfeasible.

(3) The terrain in the operational area is of such a nature that both VC and NVA units will continue to have relative freedom of movement as long as their operations are conducted at the individual and small unit level.

(4) Much of the support of the local populace has been lost as indicated by the high refugee rate at the end of Operation BEAUREGARD.

b. Lessons Learned: The LRRP is an intelligence collection agency and by virtue of the nature of its operations is often subjected to enemy contact. Since enemy contact is of such a positive intelligence nature, it has been deemed necessary to have a reaction force available in conjunction with all LRRP operations. The force need only be of sufficient size to maintain contact with an enemy force (e.g. - platoon) until an adequate size force is mustered for employment.

12. (C) Remarks:

a. The brigade was successful in deploying units in those areas considered to be occupied by the enemy. However, Operation BEAUREGARD was characterized by a distinct lack of significant contact due to the purposeful evasive tactics of those NVA units in the AO.

b. The following is a breakout of the enemy weapons and materiel losses during Operation BEAUREGARD (EAGLE BAIT):

(1) Weapons Captured:

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>COUNTRY OF MANUFACTURE</u>
AK-47	2	ChiCom
7.62mm Mosin Nagant	3	Russia
7.62mm PISH, Model 1953	1	ChiCom
12 gauge Stevens shotgun	1	US
.45 cal Thompson SMG	1	US
.30 cal carbine, M1	1	US

(2) Ammunition:

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
7.62mm (short)	257
7.62mm (long)	59
.45 caliber	27
12 gauge shotgun	16

(3) Food:


<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Rice	28 1/2 Tons
Barley	3 Tons

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
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Inclosure 2A (Operation Schematic, Period 24 - 30 June) to Combat
Operations After Action Report, Operation SEAUDECAUD (EAGLE BAIT)

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


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
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Paragraph 2 (Operation Sentinel, dated 7 - 11 July) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Broomstick (1950-1951)



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1. Participation in Operation SEABRIDGE, D-Day 11 - 15 July to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEABRIDGE (D-Day 11-15)



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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report
Operation BEAUREGARD (Eagle Bait)

(5) Water: Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion operated a water point at TAN CANH using a 1500 GPH Erdalator which provided excellent service throughout the operation.

b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion Maintenance Detachment received 37 automotive, 80 signal, 70 armament, 20 instrument, 63 quartermaster and 47 engineer job orders.

c. Surface Transportation: 212 - 2 1/2 ton truck transportation requests were filled during the operation.

d. Air Transportation:

(1) Fixed Wing: CV-2 aircraft supporting the Brigade flew 38 sorties for a total of 553 passengers and 26.1 short tons of cargo. 12 - C130 sorties were flown for 74 passengers and 25.75 short tons of cargo.

(2) Rotary Wing: Both CH-47 and UH-1D continued to prove invaluable in aerial resupply operations of committed forces. Two UH-1D's were placed in direct support of each Infantry Battalion and provided extremely efficient tactical and administrative support to the committed units.

(3) Army aircraft lifted a total of 58.52 short tons of supplies into the forward area. Attached at Appendix 1 is the daily aerial resupply tonnage by class of supply during Operation BEAUREGARD (Eagle Bait).

e. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration was provided by 148th Quartermaster Company, and elements of USASC, QUI NHON.

(2) Bath: 148th Quartermaster Company provided excellent service throughout the operation.

3. (C) MEDICAL:

a. There were no major problems encountered in the areas of field sanitation and personal hygiene. Engineer LZ clearing teams and a single medevac helicopter without winch proved adequate for the relatively small number of casualties generated by the operation.

b. Patients Treated:

(1) WIA	42
(2) Non-Battle Injury	75
(3) Disease	<u>189</u>
Total Treated	306

c. Returned to duty	96
d. Evacuated to hospital	210
e. Remaining in holding	0

f. Hospitalized personnel (Battle Injuries) categorized by wounds are as follows:

(1) Head	3
(2) Chest	2
(3) Upper extremities	4

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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report
Operation BEAURGARD (Eagle Bait)

1. (C) ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT:

a. Support Battalion:

(1) Headquarters Detachment: Provided command and control for Support Battalion (Forward). The Detachment was organized into command, operations, communications and movement control sections.

(2) Supply Detachment: Was responsible for receipting, storage and issue of all classes of supply and provided a parachute rigger section.

(3) Maintenance Detachment: Provided repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineer and automotive items. The detachment was organized into a shop office and a recovery/contact team.

(4) Medical Company: Provided Brigade level medical service. It was organized into a company headquarters section, a surgical section, a holding section, a medical evacuation section, an emergency treatment section, and a dental section.

b. Supporting Forces:

(1) FSA, USASC, QUI NHON (TF Stinson) supported 1st Bde 101st Abn Div. FSA was collocated with Supply Detachment, Support Battalion. It was responsible for receiving and stocking Class I, III and V and for issue of Class III to aviation units.

(2) 10th Aviation Battalion: Provided 2 light airmobile companies, plus 6 UH-1D and 4 UH-1B aircraft to support tactical and logistical operations.

(3) CH-47 helicopter support was provided by 147th Aviation Company (Airmobile Medium) and 1st Cav Div (Airmobile).

(4) 498th Aviation Company: Provided Medical Aeroevacuation throughout the operation.

2. MATERIEL AND SERVICES:

a. Supply:

(1) Class I: A total of 184 short tons of "B" rations and 62 tons of Meals, Combat, Individual, Type "C" were issued during the operation. An adequate supply of "B" rations was received and "A" ration meals were issued in sufficient quantities to supplement all but 5 "B" ration meals. However, fresh vegetables and bread issues were extremely limited.

(2) Class II and IV: Class II and IV supplies were shipped from the Brigade Support Battalion in PHAN RANG and QUI NHON and CAN RANH BAY Area Support Commands. However, jungle fatigues and boots were in short supply throughout the operation.

(3) Class III: 211 short tons of Class III and IIIA were issued during the operation (excluding JP-4), to include 39,500 gallons of AVIATION, 9,500 gallons of DIESEL, and 15,900 of AVIATION (115/145). Supporting aviation units used 204,250 gallons of JP-4 (592 short tons).

(4) Class V: 149 short tons of Class V were issued during the operation. The following items remained in short supply during the operation:

(a) Hand-Held Flares

(b) White Star Cluster

(c) Green Star Cluster

(d) White Star Parachute Flares

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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report
Operation BEAUREGARD (Eagle Bait)

(4) Lower extremities	31
(5) Abdomen	2
(6) Back	<u>9</u>
Total	42

4. (U) SUMMARY:

a. Supply operations continued to be simplified by collocating the FSA, USASC, GSC, BSN and the Brigade Support Battalion. Common Supply Points were used for Class I, III and V. Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division provided Class II and IV supply.

b. Helicopter hoists: Operations in mountainous and/or heavily forested terrain continue to necessitate fitting medevac helicopters with a winch capability.

5. (U) CONCLUSIONS:

a. Duplication of effort is reduced by collocating the Forward Support Area with the organic Forward Support Element.

b. Medevac helicopters equipped with winch capability are a necessity when operating in mountainous and/or heavily forested terrain.

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(Appendix 1) to Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action
Report, Operation "BAMBI" (Sample Edit)

	CLASS I		CLASS V		MISC & WATER	
	<u>POUNDS</u>	<u>S-TONS</u>	<u>POUNDS</u>	<u>S-TONS</u>	<u>POUNDS</u>	<u>S-TONS</u>
24 June	---	---	---	---	---	---
25 June	---	---	---	---	---	---
26 June	---	---	---	---	---	---
27 June	---	---	---	---	---	---
28 June	---	---	---	---	---	---
29 June	---	---	---	---	---	---
30 June	---	---	---	---	---	---
1 July	---	---	100	.03	---	---
2 July	---	---	110	.03	---	---
3 July	---	---	---	---	---	---
4 July	700	.10	110	.03	---	---
5 July	500	.25	50	.02	---	---
6 July	9000	4.50	500	.25	1000	.50
7 July	4400	2.20	7500	3.75	2900	1.45
8 July	1600	.80	32,500	16.25	---	---
9 July	1000	.50	32,500	16.25	1000	.50
10 July	---	---	17,500	8.75	---	---
11 July	2300	1.15	800	.40	1500	.75
12 July	---	---	---	---	---	---
13 July	---	---	---	---	---	---
14 July	---	---	---	---	---	---
15 July	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL	19,000	9.50	91,670	45.82	6400	3.20

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1. (U) Background:

The 1st Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company Communications Platoon and the 1st TACCP had the joint mission of continuing the communications support of the Brigade Headquarters as initially established for Operation MAUTHORNE.

2. (C) Operations:

a. VHF Section - Not committed.

b. Communications Center Section - Provided water messenger service and secure teletype service to 1 FORTGEV.

c. Switchboard/Map Section - A two-position switchboard was operated terminating 75 communication circuits. Additional lines installed increased the wire in use in the JAX 00 area to 100 lines.

d. FM Radio Section - Two 10 mile radio nets for operational traffic. Splitting the units on the radio eased the traffic flow during peak periods. A FM relay site was organized during normal and automation network mission.

e. Maintenance Section - Continued to provide maintenance support for Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company and attachments.

f. AM Radio Section - Continued to operate a secure HTT net between LAX TO, PHAM RANG, and NHA TRANG.

g. Corps Signal Support - 5th Signal Battalion provided VHF circuits into the Corps area system and secure HTT to FORTGEV, and operate a Single Side Band Phone Patch at LAX TO, PHAM RANG, and NHA TRANG.

3. (C) Problem Areas:

a. Personnel shortages - Shortages in skilled MOS's are becoming critical, especially 31K2P, 72B2P and 72B4P, affecting communication center operations and repair capability.

b. Equipment shortages - 12 3KW AC generators were requisitioned on "02" priority in November 1965 as a replacement for the PE-75 generators, which have proved unreliable. Only one has been received.

c. TT-4 teletypewriters continue to be a critical maintenance problem. Insufficient floats are available to maintain a continuously operational machine.

d. T195 Transmitters continue to be a critical maintenance problem. Insufficient maintenance floats are available to maintain a continuously operational net or system, even though all AM Radios are consolidated under Brigade control.

e. FM communications between the Brigade and Battalion TAC Command Posts were not reliable. This can be improved by the use of ground-mounted AN/VRC-46, radio sets and Remote Control Unit AN/URC-39, and training of RTO's.

f. Several units layed wire through the Brigade Command Post area using unsatisfactory wire laying techniques. Units should review FI 24-20 with changes.

g. Telephone subscribers often did not use directory numbers. Asking for parties by name constitutes a security violation in some cases, and in all cases delaying the operation of the switchboard. Directories are available from Strike 15.

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Enclosure 3 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation BURNHAM (NORTH VIET)

1. (C) During Operation BURNHAM (NORTH VIET) this Brigade's Civil Affairs Civic Action program was directed mainly at assisting the BIN TO District Chief in his efforts to accomplish the missions assigned to him as part of the Revolutionary Development Program. Because the Brigade remained in the same area that it had been in for Operation BURNHAM, the Civil Affairs effort was principally a continuation of earlier programs designed to lessen the friction between this Brigade and the people of the area.

2. (C) In an effort to support the Revolutionary Development Program objective of the BIN TO District, this Brigade worked closely with the Sub-Sector Advisor, Capt D-Luca, and the USID representative Mr Szlach. A list of projects, in order of priority, was drawn up and as time, men, and equipment became available the projects were undertaken and completed. Some of these projects were:

- a. Grading and improving the Central Market Place in BIN CITY.
- b. Road and bridge repair, 24 mi road 3 bridges.
- c. Grading ground for a new school in BIN CITY.
- d. Cutting timber for District use.
- e. Clearing the growth along the sides of Route 50.
- f. Donating school supplies and furniture to the schools in BIN TO and BIN CITY.

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Inclosure 7 (Psy War) to Command Operations After Action Report, Operation
THUNDERBOLT (MARCH 1970)

1. (U) Psychological Objectives: To promote native civilian support, to induce action consistent with and in support of the Brigade's mission, to demoralize the enemy, and promote ralliers and returnees.

2. (U) Psychological Themes Used:

- a. Demoralize NVA and VC cadre.
- b. Rally to GVN/Allied Forces.
- c. Chieu Hoi.

3. (C) Target Audiences:

- a. NVA.
 - (1) 68th Regiment.
 - (2) 24th Regiment.
- b. Viet Cong Cadre.

4. (C) Statistics

- a. Total Speaker hours. 41 hours
- b. Total Leaflets. 13,486,000
- c. Special Leaflets produced: 3
- d. Rallies. 63
- e. Special tapes produced. 3

5. (C) Lessons Learned.

a. That the effectiveness of a tactical Psy War campaign depends on the use of military force in the operations area. Military pressure is necessary to insure response in the target audience.

b. That complete saturation of a target with leaflets is only a partial solution for an effective Psy War campaign. It must be the combined effort of leaflets and tactical pressure.

6. (U) Conclusions:

a. That the results of the Psy War effort in Operation THUNDERBOLT would have been more effective if strong military contact had been made.

b. The long range results of the Psy War effort cannot be determined, but it has been the rule in the past that the full effects take 4 - 6 weeks after a Psy War campaign.

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Inclusura 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation BURNING BUSH (1967-1968)

1. (C) Missions: 21 Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery BS of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. "B" Battery, 1st Battalion (Forward) 30th Artillery reinforced 1st Forward Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery.

2. (C) Execution: 24 - 30 June: All units were placed on standby alert. Units continued to maintain equipment. A service practice was conducted on 26 - 27 June to familiarize the Forward Observers and Mission Officers with the problems of Artillery adjustment in jungle.

a. 1 - 5 July: 1 July 1/2/320th Arty displaced at 1000 hrs from ZW04227 to ZW045315 to support screening mission of the 1/27th Infantry. 2/1/320th Arty began displacing to ZW045239 at 1100 hrs to support screening mission of 2/502d Infantry. Both units closed at 1400 hrs. During this period, two batteries of the 2/320th Arty were called in. During this period an M11 mortar was fired at 101 targets expending 402 rounds. On 051430 hrs July 3d, 2/2/320th Arty displaced to ZW060455 in support of the 1/327th Infantry. Unit closed at 2045 hrs.

b. 7 - 15 July: At 070015 hrs July 3d, 1/2/320th Arty displaced to ZW062521 to support 2/502d Infantry. Unit closed at 1745 hrs. On 6 July 2/2/320th Arty displaced to ZW043553 in support of 1/27th Infantry. Unit closed at 1745 hrs. On 12 July 2/3/320th Arty displaced to ZW013210 in support of 2/502d Infantry. All elements closed back to base camp, DZ TO, at 1745 hrs 12 July 3d.

3. (C) Supply and Administration: There were adequate UN-IPs to provide the required resupply of the battalion during the operation.

4. (C) Problem Areas:

a. Displacement by two (2) C-47's. Artillery batteries can be displaced by utilizing only two C-47's. However, this places definite limitations on timely support of the infantry and delays the initiation of ground operations by supported elements. Dependent on distance of displacement, the move takes from six to nine hours. During this period the battery is operating in two positions with minimum support. Additionally the security force for the battery is divided and in some instances two forces will be required, one to secure the forward position and one to remain in the present position until displacement is complete.

b. Positioning of Radio Relays: The Battalion, during the latter phase of the operation, experienced difficulty in communicating with forward batteries because of the location of the Brigade radio relays.

5. (C) Comments:

a. The battalion for the first time displaced utilizing the "piggy-back" system. By placing ammunition under the howitzers valuable time is saved and the time on the ground by the C-47's is minimized. The battalion has the capability of moving nine howitzers by "piggy-back" and by 5 August will be capable of moving all howitzers in this manner.

b. An LVT was placed in support of the DZ UNIT Special Forces Camp during the operation. The LVT provided instruction in fire direction procedures, howitzers, the 105mm howitzers, maintenance procedures, and the emergency procedures of ammunition. Additionally, limited maintenance was performed on the howitzers and fire direction forms and records were provided to the artillery element of the camp.

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e. One GIBO company was provided as a security force for 1/2/300th Art. This force proved adequate and performed its mission in an efficient and willing manner.

f. The 3rd Combat Engineer Battalion was positioned at Z7013713 for the entire period of the operation. The primary sector of responsibility was the Brigade Tactical Operations Center and the adjacent helicopter pads with secondary sections being one of the firing batteries. From 2/1 June to 15 July the center was non-operational for 12 hours. Operating periods for the center were from 1600 hrs to 0600 hrs daily; this being the most likely period of mortar attacks.

g. (U) Recommendation: A minimum of four (4) CH-47's be placed in support of the battalion during future airborne operations.

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Enclosure 1 (List of Positions Occupied and Ammunition Expended) to
Enclosure 2 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation HUNGRIED (Cont'd)

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21 June - 1 July
POSITION: 7554239
Conducted: 0

2 July - 5 July
POSITION: 7554239
Conducted: 0

6 July - 7 July
POSITION: 27001223
Conducted: 0

8 July - 12 July
POSITION: 27001223
Conducted: 15 MI

Total # Mm's Fired: 42

1 Prep

Expended:

364 MM

3 Def Cons

18 HEVT

20 TP

10 MC

Survived all batteries: 1 sniper rifle & 1 Gavo-Turnal cannon destroyed.

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24 June - 1 July
POSITION: Z0041227
Conducted: 0

2 July - 7 July
POSITION: Z0041227
Conducted: 27

1 Def Cons
Total # Men's Fired: 657
1 Tgt of Opp Expended: 100

8 July - 13 July
POSITION: Z0041227
Conducted: 31

1 Def Cons
Total # Men's Fired: 50
2 Def Cons Expended: 497
12 100/rd 18
2 Svc Practices 4
3 Tgt of Opp 10

14 July - 16 July
POSITION: Z0041227
Conducted: 0

Battery 2

24 June - 7 July
POSITION: Z0015217
Conducted: 1

Total # Men's Fired: 1
Calibration Expended: 49

8 July - 9 July
POSITION: Z0015217
Conducted: 12

1 Def Cons
Total # Men's Fired: 43
8 Def Cons Expended: 227
1 100/rd 30
1 Svc Practice 22
1 Ill 10

13 July - 16 July
POSITION: Z0015217
Conducted: 0

Battery 2

21 June - 16 July
POSITION: Z0015217
Conducted: 27

Total # Men's Fired: 454
Expended: 2200
27 Svc Practices 22
1 100/rd 12
1 Calibration 12

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